Publications

Policy Brief 11: Fighting corruption in West African coastal states: how Collective Action can help
Asset RecoveryCollective Action

Policy Brief 11: Fighting corruption in West African coastal states: how Collective Action can help

11/2022
Africa is estimated to lose an unbelievable USD 88.6 billion (3.7% of Africa’s GDP) each year to illicit financial flows, of which corruption is a major component. Rooting out corruption is a collective effort, and the private sector has a major role to play in laying down the foundations for clean business environments and sustainable development. That is why anti-corruption Collective Action  has got so much to offer Africa, and in particular West African coastal states keen to maximise their clear economic potential. As the spectrum of Collective Action initiatives is quite large, it allows for innovative measures where governments, companies and civil society organisations (CSOs) can join forces toward a common objective, despite their different perspectives. This collaborative approach therefore provides a fertile ground for constructive dialogue between like-minded stakeholders, as well as an opportunity to understand the private sector’s language and reality.  CSOs have an important part to play in bringing Collective Action to the fight against corruption in West Africa. They must continue to initiate, facilitate and engage in Collective Action initiatives to help raise awareness and build bridges. Their presence can bring credibility, independent oversight and accountability to the initiatives. This Policy Brief is based on conversations held with CSOs based in Benin (Social Watch Benin), Ghana (Ghana Integrity Initiative), Ivory Coast (Ivorian Youth Leaders’ Network) and Togo (The Togolese National Agency for Consumers and the Environment). It aims to capture their experiences, challenges and outlook on what the future for Collective Action could hold in the region. Despite their different backgrounds, they are united on one point: fighting corruption collectively by raising the voice of the private sector is an important step to pave the way for sustainable economic growth. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669, and supports the Basel Institute's work on anti-corruption Collective Action with funding from the Siemens Integrity Initiative. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Young, Liza. 2022. “Fighting corruption in West African coastal states: how Collective Action can help.” Policy Brief 11, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/pb-11.
Policy Brief 11: Lutte contre la corruption dans les États côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest : comment l’Action Collective peut aider
Collective Action

Policy Brief 11: Lutte contre la corruption dans les États côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest : comment l’Action Collective peut aider

11/2022
Chaque année, les flux financiers illicites, dont la corruption est une composante majeure, font perdre environ 88,6 milliards de dollars (3,7 % de son PIB) à l'Afrique. La lutte contre ce fléau est un effort collectif et le secteur privé a un rôle majeur à jouer dans la promotion d'un environnement économique prospère et d’un développement durable du continent. C'est pourquoi l'Action Collective  contre la corruption a tant à offrir à l'Afrique, et en particulier aux États côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest désireux de maximiser leur potentiel économique. Le spectre des initiatives d'Action Collective étant assez large, il permet des mesures innovantes où gouvernements, entreprises et organisations de la société civile (OSC) unissent leurs forces, malgré des intérêts parfois divergents. Cette approche collaborative constitue à la fois un terrain fertile pour un dialogue constructif, et une occasion de mieux comprendre les réalités du secteur privé.  Les OSC ont également un rôle important à jouer dans la promotion de l’Action Collective en Afrique de l'Ouest. Elles doivent continuer à initier, faciliter et s'engager dans des initiatives d'Action Collective pour aider à sensibiliser et construire des ponts entre différentes parties prenantes. Leur présence apporte souvent transparence et crédibilité aux initiatives. Les résultats présentés dans ce Policy Brief sont issus d’échanges avec des OSC basées au Bénin (Social Watch Bénin), au Ghana (Ghana Integrity Initiative), en Côte d'Ivoire (Le Réseau des jeunes leaders pour l’intégrité) et au Togo (L’Alliance nationale des consommateurs et de l’environnement). Il vise à relater les défis et les opportunités que représente l'Action Collective dans la région.  Malgré les différents contextes dans lesquels elles opèrent, ces organisations sont unies sur un point : lutter collectivement contre la corruption en faisant entendre la voix du secteur privé – élément crucial pour une croissance économique durable.  About this Policy Brief Cette publication fait partie de la série des Policy Briefs du Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN 2624-9669. Elle est publiée sous licence Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Citation suggérée : Young, L. 2022. « Corruption dans les États côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest : comment l'Action Collective peut aider ». Policy Brief 11, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur : baselgovernance.org/pb11. Le Policy Brief est publié par l'équipe Secteur privé du Basel Institute on Governance. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre des efforts continus de l'équipe pour développer et promouvoir l'Action Collective anti-corruption, avec le soutien de la Siemens Integrity Initiative.
Working Paper 41: Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 41: Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia

10/2022
The final recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia (‘the Commission’) urged the government to legislate an unexplained wealth order (‘UWO’) as part of a wider approach to counter the prevalence of money laundering and proceeds of crime in the province. This document analyses the feasibility of this recommendation. It: briefly explains the concept of unexplained wealth and how it can be targeted through legislative instruments; outlines the reasons for which the Commissioner proposed a UWO for British Columbia; explains how a UK-style UWO works and assess the probability that a mechanism of this kind would successfully recover unexplained wealth in British Columbia;  addresses the constitutional issues that may arise if a UK-style UWO was introduced, as outlined by former Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Thomas A. Cromwell C.C., in his annexed opinion to the report; explains other legislative options that target unexplained wealth (including those in Western Australia and Ireland) and assess their constitutional compatibility and potential effectiveness as compared to a UK-style UWO; explores the legal rights issues that may arise if either a UK-style UWO or a traditional UWO was introduced; and outlines the legislative safeguards that could be put in place to reduce the risk that any such mechanisms would negatively impact on established legal rights. About and acknowledgements This document has been prepared by experts working with the Basel Institute on Governance, an independent not-for-profit organisation dedicated to countering corruption and other financial crimes, and the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, an organisation devoted to anti-corruption efforts and legislative change. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. Open-access licence and citation The publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed for sharing and republishing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew, and Jeffrey Simser. 2022. “Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia: An analysis of Recommendation 101 of the Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia.” Working Paper 41, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-41
Case Study 9: The Kiamba case: achieving a civil asset forfeiture order and criminal prosecution
Asset Recovery

Case Study 9: The Kiamba case: achieving a civil asset forfeiture order and criminal prosecution

09/2022
This case study describes how authorities in Kenya achieved both a civil asset forfeiture order and a criminal conviction against a former public official involved in corrupt procurement deals. The case involves Jimmy Kiamba, the former Chief Finance Officer of Nairobi County in Kenya, who conspired with three others to defraud the county government by authorising payments for phantom office equipment. Following a financial investigation and civil proceedings under Kenya’s Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003), Kiamba was ordered to forfeit around USD 3 million in assets to the state. A subsequent criminal case based on the same underlying facts and investigation ultimately led to his conviction in 2022. The case demonstrates how a “belt and braces” approach – applying both civil and criminal proceedings – can help anti-corruption agencies to confiscate the proceeds of corruption relatively quickly, even if the criminal case drags on or fails to reach the stricter standard of proof. It also highlights the impact of providing hands-on mentoring to investigators during real ongoing cases and over an extended period of time. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, ISSN 2813-3900. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. The Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. Many such cases are drawn from partner countries of the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery. Suggested citation: Marsh, Simon. 2022. “The Kiamba case: achieving a civil asset forfeiture order and criminal prosecution." Case Study 9, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.
Quick Guide 28: Money laundering through the gambling industry
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 28: Money laundering through the gambling industry

09/2022
This quick guide sets out how criminals abuse the gambling industry to launder illicit funds. It includes numerous recent case studies to illustrate different ways of laundering money in casinos, online gambling websites, bars and clubs, as well as physical and online sports betting services. The guide also looks at what gambling businesses and public authorities can do to better prevent and detect money laundering in this industry. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Case Study 8: Windward Trading: Charging a shelf company with money laundering and returning confiscated funds to Kenyan citizens
Asset Recovery

Case Study 8: Windward Trading: Charging a shelf company with money laundering and returning confiscated funds to Kenyan citizens

09/2022
This case study describes how authorities in Kenya and Jersey worked together to unlock progress in a long-running case involving around USD 3.7 million in corruptly acquired funds. The money was held in the bank account of the shelf company Windward Trading, which was used to channel corrupt payments relating to power generation in Kenya. The money had been seized in Jersey since 2011 following a money laundering investigation and subsequent criminal proceedings. Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) reasonable grounds to suspect the funds were proceeds of corruption. But the case had stalled due to issues with extraditing the two suspects to Jersey to stand trial. Proactive informal cooperation was key to building trust between the parties. This helped to break the deadlock, find legal solutions to recover the funds and agree their safe return for the benefit of Kenyan citizens. The parties mutually agreed that the recovered assets should be used for medical equipment and pandemic relief in Kenya. Crown agents and Amref Health Africa are responsible for disbursing and safeguarding the funds. A framework agreement signed by the Governments of Kenya, Jersey, Switzerland and the UK was used as a basis for negotiations on the return of the funds. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). The Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. Many such cases are drawn from partner countries of the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery. Suggested citation: Marsh, Simon. 2022. “Windward Trading: Charging a shelf company with money laundering and returning confiscated funds to Kenyan citizens." Case Study 8, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.
Buenas Prácticas en Anticorrupción: Innovando en Integridad Empresarial en Colombia - Segunda Edición
Collective Action

Buenas Prácticas en Anticorrupción: Innovando en Integridad Empresarial en Colombia - Segunda Edición

08/2022
This is the second edition of a publication, jointly published by the Global Compact Network Colombia, Alliance for Integrity and UNODC. It presents best practices that demonstrate the commitments of Colombian companies under the Global Compact to contribute to transparency and integrity in the country. The best practices are focused on different anti-corruption issues including reporting channels, culture of integrity, conflicts of interest and risk management. The success of the measures is designed to act as an example for other companies to join forces in attaining the Sustainable Development Goals and building a better country for all. The Basel Institute was pleased to contribute to the evaluation of the good practices as part of the jury.
Working Paper 40: Developing anti-corruption interventions addressing social norms: Lessons from a field pilot in Tanzania
Public Governance

Working Paper 40: Developing anti-corruption interventions addressing social norms: Lessons from a field pilot in Tanzania

07/2022
This Working Paper provides guidance on developing anti-corruption interventions based on a Social Norms and Behaviour Change (SNBC) approach. Still a relatively nascent field, SNBC interventions typically address social norms that make corruption acceptable or expected, and attempt to influence behaviours away from corrupt practices.  The guidance is based on lessons learned from a largely successful pilot project in Tanzania that targeted social norms fuelling bribery ("gift giving") in health facilities and attempted to change the behaviours of both health care providers and users away from exchanging gifts. Survey results showed a 14–44% decrease in gift-giving intentions, attitudes and positive beliefs among hospital users following the pilot intervention. The guidance covers: How to identify when a SNBC approach is suitable Essential background research needed to design anti-corruption SNBC interventions Frameworks to formulate theories of change Specific elements to build into SNBC interventions What practitioners should expect when embarking on an SNBC intervention Ways they can help build evidence and understanding of SNBC approaches in the anti-corruption field. About and acknowledgements This publication was supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The contents of this publication do not represent the official position of either BMZ or GIZ. The pilot intervention that serves as the basis for most of the reflections included in this document was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE), funded with UK aid from the UK government. Open-access licence and citation The publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia. 2022. “Developing anti-corruption interventions addressing social norms: Lessons from a field pilot in Tanzania.” Working Paper 40, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-40
Quick Guide 27: Court monitoring
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 27: Court monitoring

07/2022
As part of a multi-year engagement in Kenya, the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery is monitoring the progress of certain corruption cases in court. The aim is to identify reasons for delays in major corruption trials, as a basis for developing reforms to streamline and speed up the court process. In this quick guide, our Court Monitor Mary Muthoni explains the what, why and how of court monitoring more generally.  The guide covers: What court monitoring is What it can achieve, using the example of Kenya's Eyes in the Courtroom programme, which has achieved significant impact on outcomes in wildlife crime cases Different models: systemic, thematic, ad-hoc Characteristics of the ideal court monitor… Information sources How to measure impact of a court monitoring programme About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Policy Brief 10: Using anti-money laundering frameworks to fight illegal wildlife trade in Uganda
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Policy Brief 10: Using anti-money laundering frameworks to fight illegal wildlife trade in Uganda

06/2022
In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) to strengthen the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Among other commitments, Uganda undertook to demonstrate that law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities apply the money laundering offence consistent with the identified risks.  Studies show that Uganda has high risks for cross-border movement of illegally obtained wildlife and wildlife products, both as a source and transit country. In addition, Uganda and the East African region in general have made some massive seizures of illegal wildlife products, which points to organised criminal activity. Notably, no money laundering prosecutions have to date arisen out of illegal wildlife trade (IWT) as a predicate offence in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. This short Policy Brief provides an outline of how the AML framework (intelligence, investigations and prosecutions) can be utilised to help combat IWT and the corruption that facilitates it. The insights are drawn from the Ugandan context, but can be applied with appropriate adjustments to other jurisdictions seeking to strengthen efforts to combat IWT and related corruption/money laundering. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669, and supports the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Walugembe, Tom. 2022. “Using anti-money laundering frameworks to fight illegal wildlife trade.” Policy Brief 10, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/pb-10. This Policy Brief was funded by UK Aid through the IWT Challenge Fund. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK Government. This research is co-funded through a core donation to the Green Corruption programme from the Principality of Liechtenstein.
Quick Guide 26: National money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Quick Guide 26: National money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments

06/2022
This quick guide explains the role of national risk assessments in addressing money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks. It explains how national risk assessments are conducted, challenges in terms of methodology and data availability, and how well countries are doing at performing them. NRAs are a critical element of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on ML/TF. They also provide data in special reports of the Basel AML Index. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 38: Cryptocurrencies in Asia and beyond: law, regulation and enforcement
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 38: Cryptocurrencies in Asia and beyond: law, regulation and enforcement

05/2022
The crypto industry has exploded in recent years, and authorities in different countries have been reacting in very different ways. Some have banned cryptocurrencies, while others are embracing them to varying degrees. Some are working hard to align their anti-money laundering regulations with FATF standards, while others are turning a blind eye. A few countries have confiscated huge quantities of crypto assets linked to crime and money laundering. Others are at square one in terms of enforcement, risking becoming a hub for crypto crime and money laundering and posing a serious vulnerability in the world’s financial system. This Working Paper draws on a detailed analysis of how selected countries are addressing legal, regulatory and enforcement issues around cryptocurrencies and other virtual assets. The analysis is focused on Asia, but set in the context of global trends in crypto law, regulation and enforcement. It explores critical questions that will shape policies around virtual assets at the corporate, national and international levels: What is working in terms of crypto regulation and enforcement? What are the implications of different policy choices on crypto assets – for the industry, for the countries themselves and for global financial integrity as a whole? What would the crypto wave possibly bring next? The Paper also highlights broader developments needed to bring light and clarity to laws, policies and practices around the crypto industry, such as collaboration between both market players and governments. Jurisdictions touched upon in this Working Paper alphabetically include Bhutan, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the Philippines, the People’s Republic of China, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam. A list of key terms and abbreviations have been prepared in the Annex to this Working Paper for the readers’ easy reference. About this Working Paper This Working Paper is a collaboration between Dorothy Siron, Co-Managing Partner, Zhong Lun Law Firm LLP and Federico Paesano, Senior Financial Investigation Specialist, Basel Institute on Governance. Dorothy Siron provided the bulk of the analysis and discussion, while Federico Paesano provided a selection of case studies and was co-author of the seven recommendations contained in section 4. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. The publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Siron, Dorothy, and Federico Paesano. 2022. “Cryptocurrencies in Asia and beyond: law, regulation and enforcement.” Working Paper 38, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-38 Disclaimer: This Working Paper does not, and is not intended to, constitute and/or substitute legal or other professional advice. The content of this Working Paper is updated as of 4 May 2022 and is intended for general informational purposes only. No representations have been made as to its accuracy and completeness. You should seek independent legal or other professional advice before acting or relying on any of the information contained herein.
Doing Business With Integrity: Stories from SMEs in Europe and Eurasia
Collective Action

Doing Business With Integrity: Stories from SMEs in Europe and Eurasia

04/2022
Business ethics, integrity, and compliance are often relatively new concepts for businesses in emerging markets, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To help SMEs realize the benefits of business integrity and offer practical suggestions to implement robust mechanisms for compliance and ethics, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) published the Strengthening Ethical Conduct & Business Integrity: A Guide for Companies in Emerging Markets in December 2020. The Guide offers practical recommendations to small business owners on how to apply existing anti-corruption compliance tools to their operations and growing needs for effective risk mitigation strategies and approaches. This new publication Doing Business with Integrity: Stories from Small-and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Europe and Eurasia seeks to supplement the Guide by providing specific, real-world examples of both business integrity challenges that companies face and approaches they use to overcome such challenges.
Guia de Boas Práticas Anticorrupção da Agroindústria
Collective Action

Guia de Boas Práticas Anticorrupção da Agroindústria

04/2022
Drawing upon good practices identified in anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives in Brazil, this Guide serves as a compass to guide agribusinesses and other sectors that are interested in promoting ethics and transparency in their daily business practices.
Quick Guide 25: Tax investigations and illegal wildlife trade
Asset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Quick Guide 25: Tax investigations and illegal wildlife trade

03/2022
What role could tax investigations play in detecting, investigating and prosecuting cases of illegal wildlife trade? Potentially a large one, with the right coordination and capacity. This quick guide by Jovile Mungyereza, Financial Investigation Specialist in our Green Corruption programme and former Tax Investigations manager at the Uganda Revenue Authority, gives a brief introduction to the surprisingly under-researched and under-utilised possibility of using tax laws and investigations to target high-level wildlife traffickers. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229, and was funded by the UK Government through the IWT Challenge Fund.
Quick Guide 24: Internal controls and anti-corruption
ComplianceGreen Corruption

Quick Guide 24: Internal controls and anti-corruption

02/2022
Broadly, “internal controls” refers to systems of policies, procedures and practices to prevent, detect and respond to issues, errors and irregularities.  Systems of internal control can be very effective in addressing corrupt conduct, which is the focus of this quick guide. But internal controls can also address other problems that affect an organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness, such as poor employee performance or the failure to accomplish important organisational goals.  The guide outlines what internal controls are, gives examples of internal controls in a public institution, and emphasises success factors – like independence, real consequences and credible reporting channels. The guide is of broad relevance, but linked to a pilot project of the Basel Institute’s Green Corruption team. The project seeks to assess and make recommendations to strengthen internal controls relating to wildlife crime investigations and prosecutions in three countries. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Policy Brief 9: Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice
Public Governance

Policy Brief 9: Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice

02/2022
Corruption is frequently associated with money alone and the behaviours of a few individual “bad apples” operating in otherwise healthy governance systems. This is too simplistic. As the latest research shows, including research in Tanzania and Uganda on which this Policy Brief is based, corruption is a networked phenomenon. This Policy Brief explains what this means and its implications for anti-corruption practice. When ordinary citizens and business people face problems, like constrained access to public services or an uneven playing field, they invest time, effort and resources in building informal networks. Held together by personal connections and corrupt payments, these informal networks are a problem-solving mechanism. They allow members – such as business people, other citizens and public officials – to pursue a variety of goals. The networks aid in easing access to public services, for example, or helping a business to run smoothly, or securing business opportunities with the government. Informal networks can be leveraged to speed up long and complicated permit processes or exploit weaknesses in formal tender processes to obtain undue access to contracts. When red tape is used by public officials to extort bribes from service users, informal networks can help manage and overcome these demands.  In contexts in which these informal networks are widespread, the research shows that conventional anti-corruption measures, such as introducing more regulations, policies and controls, can actually backfire and increase corruption.  Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of networked corruption requires a shift in thinking and approaches: Focusing on networked corruption as opposed to individual corrupt behaviours. Tackling corruption both from the demand and the supply side by addressing inefficiencies and weaknesses in public systems that cause problems for ordinary citizens and business people. This may make it less likely that they will resort to corruption through informal networks to overcome the public service weaknesses. Harnessing informal networks for anti-corruption objectives. This includes leveraging new insights into social norms and networks and establishing Collective Action initiatives to better target the underlying drivers of corruption. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It presents findings from a research project entitled “Harnessing informality: Designing anti-corruption network interventions and strategic use of legal instruments”, funded by UK Aid as part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE). It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia, Jacopo Costa, and Saba Kassa. 2022. "Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice." Policy Brief 9, Basel Institute on Governance.
Quick Guide 23: Informal networks and anti-corruption
Public Governance

Quick Guide 23: Informal networks and anti-corruption

02/2022
Why do many countries still struggle with high levels of corruption, in spite of years of investment in anti-corruption programmes and even where the right laws, rules and institutions are in place? We believe one reason is that anti-corruption laws and policies are too often focused narrowly on individuals, rather than networks of individuals. In our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks. And it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Policy Brief 8: It takes a network to defeat a network – What Collective Action practitioners can learn from research into corrupt networks
Collective ActionPublic Governance

Policy Brief 8: It takes a network to defeat a network – What Collective Action practitioners can learn from research into corrupt networks

12/2021
This Policy Brief distils recommendations for Collective Action practitioners based on empirical insights on certain forms of corruption involving private-sector actors. Field research carried out in Tanzania and Uganda produced detailed case studies that show how informal networks link private and public sector actors to pursue common illicit goals, such as gaining an unfair business advantage, avoiding a sanction, decreasing taxes owed or jumping the queue at the point of delivery of public services. Corruption, most often bribery, is the currency that works to cement and nurture those networks. This Policy Brief is based on that research and a series of in-depth interviews with Collective Action practitioners working in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America. The goal is to extract insights from what we have learned about the networks that fuel corruption and discuss implications for anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives.  About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, C., Costa, Hans,V., J., Koechlin, L. and Wannenwetsch, S. (2021) It takes a network to defeat a network: What Collective Action practitioners can learn from research into corrupt networks. Policy Brief 8, Basel Institute on Governance. The research underpinning this Policy Brief was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme, funded with UK Aid from the British people.
Case studies from Uganda: GI-ACE research on informal networks and corruption
Public Governance

Case studies from Uganda: GI-ACE research on informal networks and corruption

11/2021
The four case studies in this collection form part of a research project entitled Harnessing informality: Designing anti-corruption network interventions and strategic use of legal instruments” funded by UK Aid as part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE). The research project aimed to understand how informal networks that are associated with different types of corruption are exactly articulated, operationalised and managed, with a view to distilling lessons of value to anti-corruption practitioners. The case studies describe informal networks associated with bribery and procurement fraud. They include visual graphics of the informal networks and connections between different actors. Together with the research report and six case studies from Tanzania, they shed light on the functioning of informal networks in East Africa. The case studies were prepared with the help of Robert Lugolobi, independent consultant. Contents: The use of informal networks to obtain a driver’s licence Network transactions involving the land registration office Informal networks in the transport, tour and ticketing business Informal networks in the chemical sector
Case studies from Tanzania: GI-ACE research on informal networks and corruption
Public Governance

Case studies from Tanzania: GI-ACE research on informal networks and corruption

11/2021
The six case studies in this collection form part of a research project entitled Harnessing informality: Designing anti-corruption network interventions and strategic use of legal instruments” funded by UK Aid as part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE). The research project aimed to understand how informal networks that are associated with different types of corruption are exactly articulated, operationalised and managed, with a view to distilling lessons of value to anti-corruption practitioners. The case studies describe informal networks associated with bribery and procurement fraud. They include visual graphics of the informal networks and connections between different actors. Together with the research report and four case studies from Uganda, they shed light on the functioning of informal networks in East Africa. The case studies were prepared with Dr. Danstan Mukono of the University of Dar es Salaam. Contents: Seeking tax clearance through informal networks in Dar es Salaam Informal networking and tendering practices in local government Informal networks and transactional exchange in the transportation sector Informal networking for business startup Informal networking and the formalization of unplanned urban land Informal connections and favoritism in service levies and business licences
Working Paper 37: The Green Corruption paradox: Natural resource management and environmental corruption in Indonesia
Green Corruption

Working Paper 37: The Green Corruption paradox: Natural resource management and environmental corruption in Indonesia

09/2021
This Working Paper details the findings of a survey of Indonesians’ perceptions of corruption, the economy and the environment in July 2021. The survey was a joint initiative of the Green Corruption team at the Basel Institute on Governance and leading Indonesian pollster Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI). It consisted of a national public opinion survey covering 2,580 respondents and in-depth interviews with 30 private-sector representatives working in various natural resource sectors. The survey reveals what we call the Green Corruption paradox: Conflicting, and arguably mutually exclusive, views on all three topics can co-exist. Despite seeing the presence of and being deeply concerned about corruption and environmental degradation, people tend to focus on livelihoods when times are hard.  People also, according to the survey data, favour economic structures that appear to channel the benefits of natural resource utilisation more directly to citizens. In Indonesia, this means rejecting private companies – particularly foreign-owned – in favour of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and people’s cooperatives. The report ends with five key recommendations that can inform Indonesian policy and the interventions of donors and civil society organisations concerned with conservation, anti-corruption and sustainable development. About this Working Paper This research was made possible with the generous support of the American people through the USAID CEGAH programme. The publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Grossmann, Juhani, Rizka Halida, and Tara Suryandari. 2021. “The Green Corruption paradox: Natural resource management and environmental corruption in Indonesia.” Working Paper 37, Basel Institute on Governance and LSI. Available at: https://baselgovernance.org/publications/natural-resource-management-and-environmental-corruption-indonesia-survey-report
Case Study 7: Upholding an unexplained wealth judgement in Kenya’s Anglo Leasing affair
Asset Recovery

Case Study 7: Upholding an unexplained wealth judgement in Kenya’s Anglo Leasing affair

08/2021
This case study describes how Kenya’s civil illicit enrichment legislation enabled the recovery of corruptly acquired assets from a former Chief Accountant at the Treasury. It examines a 2021 unexplained wealth (illicit enrichment) case in Kenya involving the former Chief Accountant Patrick Ochieno Abachi. The case is related to Kenya’s so-called Anglo Leasing scandal, in which 18 high-value government security contracts were allegedly awarded to fictitious companies in the early 2000s. It illustrates one set of circumstances in which civil unexplained wealth (or civil illicit enrichment) legislation can be an extremely useful tool to target assets stolen through corruption. The series of judgments has provided some valuable insights into Kenya’s law targeting unexplained assets, specifically: its key features and how they are applied; the evidentiary importance of asset declaration forms; how to prove assets are “unexplained” through financial analysis of a suspect’s income and assets; common legal challenges to illicit enrichment. For this case study, Phillip Kagucia of Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) spoke to Andrew Dornbierer, Senior Asset Recovery Specialist and author of the Basel Institute’s open-access book Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2022. “The Russian arms dealer case.” Case Study 4, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.
Policy Brief 7: Reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking through behaviour change interventions
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Policy Brief 7: Reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking through behaviour change interventions

07/2021
Behaviour change interventions aimed at reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking are an important part of efforts to prevent wildlife crime. This policy brief summarises lessons learned about how to develop and frame effective messages in the context of these interventions, based on field work conducted in Uganda.  A key first step is to narrowly identify the right target audience. While a general public awareness campaign may have its merits, it may be more effective to focus on those identified as most vulnerable to participating in wildlife trafficking, namely young men, those that live around wildlife trafficking hotspots and those involved in trade. Second, it appears most promising to formulate messages that challenge narrow utilitarian perceptions of wildlife by highlighting the hidden costs of trafficking and its negative impact on the economy and the environment. Messages that focus on legal risks should showcase successes in detection and sanctions, especially in a context in which impunity is perceived to be high. Other messages that seek to challenge the overvalued benefits of engaging in wildlife trafficking in relation to wealth and social status should be carefully nuanced to avoid rejection. Third, how we frame such messages is equally important. The research suggests that appealing to social identity and highlighting personal consequences are the most promising frames to adopt. Overall, practitioners are advised to develop and test messages and approaches that are personal and precise. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669, and supports the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Kassa, S., Costa, J., Lugolobi, R. & Baez Camargo, C. (2021) Reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking through behaviour change interventions. Policy Brief 7, Basel Institute on Governance. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Working Paper 36: Revealing the networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes: an analysis of the Toledo–Odebrecht case using social network analysis and network ethnography
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset RecoveryPublic Governance

Working Paper 36: Revealing the networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes: an analysis of the Toledo–Odebrecht case using social network analysis and network ethnography

07/2021
This working paper is based on an empirical investigation of corruption and illicit exchange related to the so-called “Lava Jato” or “Odebrecht” scandal. Focusing on former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and his laundering of bribes obtained from the construction giant Odebrecht, the analysis aims to test the usefulness of applying a network lens to better understand the mechanisms underlying grand corruption cases. It also aims to further illuminate the nexus between corruption and money laundering and the role of hidden and offshore financial infrastructures in facilitating the illicit schemes.  The research used a combination of social network analysis and network ethnography techniques to explore the following questions:  How do money laundering activities and offshore financial infrastructures sustain corruption?  Who are the key actors involved, how do they interact and what is their division of labour?  How do actors and clusters govern the social-financial web of relations?  Answering these questions with empirical evidence related to a specific case makes it possible to better understand how the connection between corruption and money laundering using offshore financial infrastructure works. It also supports the emerging understanding of corruption as a collective, transnational and financially advanced phenomenon.  About this report This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Costa, J., 2021. Revealing the networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes: an analysis of the Toledo–Odebrecht case using social network analysis and network ethnography. Working Paper 36, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https://baselgovernance.org/publications/working-paper-36-revealing-net…
Quick Guide 22: Analysing a suspect’s financial affairs in a corruption case
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 22: Analysing a suspect’s financial affairs in a corruption case

07/2021
This quick guide explains how investigators and prosecutors can use Source and Application of Funds analysis to inform corruption and money laundering investigations and prosecutions and to generate evidence for use in court. The method enables anti-corruption officers to build financial profiles of suspects by systematically calculating the amount of money that the suspect has accumulated and spent during a particular period, compared to their legal and known income.  It is authored by the Training team of the International Centre for Asset Recovery, which trains law anti-corruption officers around the world in the use of Source and Application of Funds analysis as part of financial investigations and criminal proceedings for corruption and money laundering offences. The Basel Institute also provides a free eLearning course on Source and Application of Funds analysis and has published a technical guidance document on the method with specific application to illicit enrichment cases. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 21: Strategic anti-corruption guidelines for development agencies
Public Governance

Quick Guide 21: Strategic anti-corruption guidelines for development agencies

06/2021
In their efforts to promote sustainable development around the world, development agencies and their country offices face a variety of corruption risks.  Why is it important for development agencies to understand and take a strategic approach to addressing corruption issues? What is the role of strategic guidelines in doing this, and how are they best developed and implemented? In this quick guide, Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team, explains the purpose, focus and value of strategic anti-corruption guidelines for development agencies. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Wildlife crime learning series – understanding risks, avenues for action
Green Corruption

Wildlife crime learning series – understanding risks, avenues for action

04/2021
This series of four publications are the PDF versions of a flexible and practical learning resource developed by the Green Corruption programme at the Basel Institute on Governance. The introductory series covers: Illegal wildlife trade and financial crime Illegality in the exotic pet trade Forest crime and the illegal timber trade Marine species trafficking The series is broadly aimed at: Private-sector companies exposed to risks of illegal wildlife trade and related crimes, including financial institutions, transport companies, traders and wholesale retailers Policy makers Law enforcement Practitioners in both conservation and anti-corruption fields The aim is to broaden understanding of the threats that wildlife crimes pose to sustainable development and clean business. It provides relevant information, statistics and background knowledge to help enhance policies and processes aimed at curbing wildlife crime and associated risks. The focus is on financial crimes and supply chain vulnerabilities that facilitate the illegal trade in wildlife and thereby increase companies’ legal, financial and reputational risks. This learning resource and many more are available as interactive learning tools on the Basel Institute’s LEARN platform. The Green Corruption programme at the Basel Institute on Governance applies anti-corruption and governance tools to address environmental crime and degradation. For more information, see www.baselgovernance.org/green-corruption This publication was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein. The work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). It is based on content provided by Patricia Raxter with editing and other input from Alexander Berman, Juhani Grossmann, Monica Guy, Shane McLean, Manuel Medina and David Ward. Citation: Basel Institute on Governance, 2021. Wildlife crime – understanding risks, avenues for action. Basel: Basel Institute on Governance, https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wildlife-crime-series
Hout Bay and the illegal lobster trade: a case study in recovering illicit proceeds of IUU fishing and wildlife trafficking
Asset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Hout Bay and the illegal lobster trade: a case study in recovering illicit proceeds of IUU fishing and wildlife trafficking

03/2021
Published under our Green Corruption programme, this is a case study about a South African fishing company, Hout Bay Fishing Industries, that overfished lobster and other protected fish in deliberate breach of government-established quotas. The case study contains numerous important lessons for those seeking to follow the money in large wildlife trafficking cases. The extent of unlawful overfishing was such that environmental experts have claimed that lobster numbers in South Africa were in free fall and that the terminal decline was only halted when a criminal investigation commenced, thereby bringing the illicit activities to an abrupt halt. Until then, large quantities of illegally caught lobster and fish in South Africa were exported to the USA and there sold for vast profit. Despite successful prosecutions in both South Africa (of the fishing company) and the USA (of the principals of the fishing company), there were significant forensic difficulties in tracing profits that were placed in complex offshore trust and company structures. The result was that although there is some evidence that the profits from this enterprise were at least USD 60 million, the total sums recovered by confiscation orders were around USD 20 million. Permissions and citation This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Please cite Dutot, Caroline. 2021. Hout Bay and the illegal lobster trade: a case study in recovering illicit proceeds of IUU fishing and wildlife trafficking. Basel Institute on Governance (Green Corruption Case Study 01), www.baselgovernance.org/publications/GC1
Policy Brief 6: Bringing intelligence and social network analysis together to fight illegal wildlife trade
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Policy Brief 6: Bringing intelligence and social network analysis together to fight illegal wildlife trade

03/2021
This policy brief explains how intelligence practitioners within law enforcement authorities and researchers skilled in social network analysis (SNA) can and should cooperate better in the fight against illegal wildlife trade (IWT).  Intelligence data are crucial for SNA researchers to conduct empirical analysis of illicit activities and dark networks. In turn, these research results can fruitfully feed back into investigations and further intelligence work. The combined effect of research and intelligence can have positive effects on the fight against IWT, and these effects are larger than the simple sum of their components.  Policymakers and stakeholders who wish to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the fight against IWT and other environmental crimes are advised to promote the systematic cooperation between intelligence practitioners and researchers, in a way that both communities can maximise the benefits of this synergetic strategy.  About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669, and supports the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Costa, Jacopo. 2021 "Bringing intelligence and social network analysis together to fight illegal wildlife trade." Policy Brief 6, Basel Institute on Governance. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Working Paper 35: Social network analysis applied to illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and Southeast Asia
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Working Paper 35: Social network analysis applied to illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and Southeast Asia

03/2021
This report presents the findings of a novel application of social network analysis (SNA) to study a criminal network surrounding an East Africa-based wildlife trafficker. This technique focuses on understanding structural, functional and sociometric characteristics of networks by mapping social interactions between individuals and groups.  Particularly, the research studies how wildlife trafficking happens, and, in doing so, offers several promising avenues to curb it. SNA makes it possible to deconstruct the criminal network in question and identity its key individuals, operative functions and flows of goods, information and money. In turn, this can sustain the activities of investigators and prosecutors to discover new leads and suspects, or to better understand the meaning of financial and information flows.     The research has been conducted under a project of PMI Impact aimed at stopping corruption from fuelling illegal wildlife trade (IWT) between East Africa and Southeast Asia.  The results show that by combining SNA (a primarily quantitative method) with network ethnography (a qualitative method), we can gain important new insights into the structures, functions and mechanisms of crime networks engaged in IWT.  About this report This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Case study: The Nun – Confiscating assets of the Shining Path terrorist organisation / Estudio de caso: La monja – Decomisando los activos de la organización terrorista Sendero Luminoso
Asset Recovery

Case study: The Nun – Confiscating assets of the Shining Path terrorist organisation / Estudio de caso: La monja – Decomisando los activos de la organización terrorista Sendero Luminoso

03/2021
This case study describes the background, legal strategy and conclusion of a landmark case of non-conviction based confiscation in Peru that has enabled the successful confiscation of around one million dollars linked to terrorist financing. The case relates to Nelly Marion Evans Risco, a British-Peruvian woman known popularly as “The Nun”. Evans held funds in a bank account in Switzerland that were intended to finance the Shining Path terrorist organisation, whose violent acts in the 1990s were responsible for an estimated 60,000 deaths in Peru. As well as explaining the prosecutorial strategy behind the case, the study also discusses the Peruvian law on non-conviction based confiscation of illicit assets, extinción de dominio. This case study was produced in the context of the Cooperation Agreement signed between the Basel Institute on Governance and the Public Prosecutor's Office of Peru. Its purpose is to provide a documentary record of emblematic cases of asset recovery in which there has been a successful synergy between both institutions. It is a knowledge tool suitable for both a general and specialised audience. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2021. Case study: The Nun – Confiscating assets of the Shining Path terrorist organisation. Basel Institute on Governance. https://baselgovernance.org/publications/case-study-the-nun  
Working Paper 34: Local certification through Collective Action: an innovative approach to anti-corruption compliance and due diligence
Collective ActionCompliance

Working Paper 34: Local certification through Collective Action: an innovative approach to anti-corruption compliance and due diligence

01/2021
How can local certification of small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs) help to alleviate anti-corruption due diligence for SMEs as well as multinational corporations (MNC) seeking to work with them. This Working Paper by the Basel Institute's Collective Action team attempts to answer that question based on discussions and analysis of current local certification initiatives in different countries and sectors. Local certification in this context means the assessment of a company’s anti-corruption compliance standards according to a method devised through a Collective Action and developed within a domestic (local) market. The local component also involves verification (certification) by a reputable organisation based in the same country as the entity that is being certified.  The paper explores: Due diligence dilemmas faced by both SMEs and MNCs. How local certification can help SMEs develop and demonstrate robust anti-corruption compliance procedures. How a trusted certification programme can help alleviate due diligence on third parties by MNCs, using a risk-based approach. Wider benefits, including raising standards of compliance across the board. How a Collective Action approach boosts the potential of local certification to achieve these wins. Special considerations and six practical recommendations for practitioners seeking to raise levels of anti-corruption compliance through a local certification scheme. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. The paper was funded by the KBA-NotaSys Integrity Fund of Koenig & Bauer Banknote Solutions. It is part of the Basel Institute’s local certification project, which aims to support innovative approaches to anti-corruption compliance and due diligence through Collective Action. . The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the KBA NotaSys Integrity Fund, Koenig & Bauer Banknote Solutions, any affiliates or any persons acting on their behalf. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Citation: Hans, V., Wannenwetsch, S. and Aiolfi, G. (2020). Local certification through Collective Action: an innovative approach to anti-corruption compliance and due diligence. Working Paper 34, Basel Institute on Governance.
Case Study 4: The Russian arms dealer case
Asset Recovery

Case Study 4: The Russian arms dealer case

12/2020
This case study explains how the Peruvian State used its non-conviction based forfeiture law, extinción de dominio, to recover a Swiss bank account containing illicit kickbacks paid for the purchase of war planes. This case was the first of a series of cases between Peru and Switzerland involving Peru’s extinción de dominio law, which enables the confiscation of illicit assets in cases where a criminal conviction of an individual is not possible or desirable. It has paved the way for other proceedings, some of which are still pending in the tribunals. The case is relatively small in monetary terms – around USD 700,000 plus interest – but hugely significant in terms of asset recovery efforts and international co-operation. The case study shows how the extinción de dominio law was applied with proportionality and in full respect of the rule of law and fundamental human rights. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2022. “The Russian arms dealer case.” Case Study 4, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.
Quick Guide 20: Financial investigations and asset recovery
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Quick Guide 20: Financial investigations and asset recovery

11/2020
Financial investigations are critical to proving crimes such as corruption, fraud and trafficking in humans or illicit goods. They are also central to confiscating illegally obtained assets from criminals – so that crime doesn’t pay.  Yet there is often confusion about who performs financial investigations, how, when and why, as well as their relationship to criminal investigations. All of these questions are further complicated by the fact that different countries have different legal systems, different laws and different terminology.  This quick guide explores the main ideas and trends in financial investigation in the context of financial crime and asset recovery cases, based on the author's experience in these areas in Portugal and Mozambique. Practitioners will need to talk openly and proactively to each other, both within their countries and across borders, to untangle the more challenging knots. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 19: Offshore structures and beneficial ownership
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 19: Offshore structures and beneficial ownership

11/2020
This quick guide by Phyllis Atkinson looks at how criminals manipulate and misuse corporate vehicles in offshore jurisdictions to launder money. It focuses on the meaning of "corporate vehicle" and "offshore" and other related concepts such as beneficial ownership. It also gives an example of how a trust, which is one common type of corporate vehicle in the vast "offshore ecosystem", can be used for illicit purposes.  About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Policy Brief 5: Curbing wildlife trafficking in Uganda: lessons for practitioners
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Policy Brief 5: Curbing wildlife trafficking in Uganda: lessons for practitioners

10/2020
This policy brief summarises the main findings from extensive field research on the drivers, facilitators and strategies of wildlife trafficking in Uganda. It translates the insights described in Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda into recommendations for practitioners and policymakers. The research shows that individuals engaging in the first stages of the trading route are driven predominantly by aspirations of wealth to overcome socio-economic hardships. This is reinforced by stereotypes that depict wildlife trade as benign and legitimate. The trafficking is also facilitated by weak governance systems that generate high levels of corruption and impunity. In such a context, opportunistic strategies sustain the operations of organised transnational wildlife trafficking networks, not least because of the availability of a ready pool of accomplices who can be co-opted to facilitate the effective consolidation, concealment and corrupt cover of high volumes of wildlife products. Policymakers who wish to reduce the attractiveness of Uganda for organised wildlife trafficking networks are advised to consider these factors when designing their interventions. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669, and supports the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Kassa, Saba, Jacopo Costa, Robert Lugolobi, and Claudia Baez Camargo. 2021 "Curbing wildlife trafficking in Uganda: lessons for practitioners." Policy Brief 5, Basel Institute on Governance. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda – the path of least resistance
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda – the path of least resistance

10/2020
This Working Paper is a key output of the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme, a multi-disciplinary engagement that targets environmental degradation through tested anti-corruption, asset recovery and governance methods. The research is funded by PMI Impact as part of a wider project on intelligence-led on financial crime in illegal wildlife trade (IWT). The fight against wildlife trafficking is a global one. Wildlife trafficking constitutes the fourth-largest form of illicit trade flow in the world. Its prevalence is often explained in economic terms: it is a “low-risk, high-profit” trade. Global efforts are therefore directed at increasing the “costs” of wildlife trafficking and reducing the rewards. However, rational cost-benefit calculations by individuals seeking personal economic gain do not fully explain why wildlife trafficking is so prevalent. Nor, therefore, will it be solved by passing new laws and strengthening law enforcement alone. Scholars as well as development and law enforcement practitioners increasingly recognise the importance of considering the way in which the local context and socio-cultural structures (so-called behavioural drivers) influence the behaviours of individuals and their propensity to engage in wildlife trafficking. This social context is not only an anchor for decision-making but also influences the strategies through which wildlife trafficking is organised. Individuals are part of informal networks. Social connections in and between the networks facilitate the transportation of wildlife products from poachers to buyers across vast geographical spaces. Public officials can be part of such networks too. In such cases those individuals, rather than enforcing the law, use their position to cover up the trafficking of wildlife products out of parks, cities and ports in East Africa. This approach of emphasising context-sensitive behavioural drivers anchors the research activities that the Public Governance division is leading in Uganda as part of the wider programme of work of the Institute. Uganda is a hub for wildlife trafficking in East Africa. High volumes of wild animal products are transported into, through and out of Uganda using various methods and strategies. Taking a worm’s-eye perspective, the research aims to provide further understanding on: Why wildlife trafficking happens, by focusing on the economic and behavioural drivers of wildlife trafficking and the role of the broader governance environment in generating increased corruption risks in public offices mandated to prevent and combat wildlife trafficking. How wildlife trafficking happens, by focusing on the role and strategies employed by informal networks of poachers, middlemen and buyers to transport high volumes of wildlife products into, through and out of Uganda. The findings are based on 47 interviews with Ugandan-based and international anti-IWT experts (IGOs, NGOs, academics and public officials) and 8 focus group discussions with wildlife conservation and anti-corruption experts in Kampala, members of reformed poachers’ networks in Western Uganda, and individuals living around a wildlife habitat in Northern Uganda. Together, these provide context-specific insights on the drivers and facilitators of wildlife trafficking in Uganda. The present report synthesises their observations and aims to contribute to the development of evidence-informed approaches to curbing the trade. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily…
Case Study 3: The Kazinda case: Putting Uganda’s illicit enrichment law to good use
Asset Recovery

Case Study 3: The Kazinda case: Putting Uganda’s illicit enrichment law to good use

09/2020
This case study explains how the Ugandan Inspectorate of Governance achieved a landmark prosecution of a former Principal Accountant in the Office of the Price Minister under the country’s illicit enrichment law. The case paves the way for development of the offence of illicit enrichment in Uganda. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Walugembe, Tom. 2020. “The Kazinda case: Putting Uganda’s illicit enrichment law to good use.” Case Study 3, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.
Case Study 2: From the UK’s first Deferred Prosecution Agreement to a plea bargain in Tanzania
Asset Recovery

Case Study 2: From the UK’s first Deferred Prosecution Agreement to a plea bargain in Tanzania

09/2020
This case study explains how Tanzania’s anti-corruption and prosecution authorities worked together and with international partners on a case involving a major bank accused of violating the UK Bribery Act and subject to the UK’s first Deferred Prosecution Agreement. The case highlights the role of plea bargaining as a potentially pragmatic solution in corruption cases that are otherwise likely to drag on for years and consume the resources and attention of investigative and prosecutorial bodies. It also shows the importance of international cooperation, both in gathering evidence and sending a message that agencies are working across borders to fight corruption. Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Nainappan, Shane. 2020. “From the UK’s first Deferred Prosecution Agreement to a plea bargain in Tanzania.” Case Study 2, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.  
Quick guide 18: Mobile money and financial crime
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Quick guide 18: Mobile money and financial crime

07/2020
The amount of money flowing through mobile payment systems such as M-Pesa, MTN Mobile Money and Orange Money has exploded, in part due to covid-19 lockdowns. Should we be worried about the use of mobile money for financial crimes?  In this quick guide, Andrew Dornbierer explains how mobile money could be abused for corruption and money laundering. Drawing on on-the-ground experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, he also outlines how law enforcement officers can take advantage of this widespread payment method to catch corruption and money laundering schemes and prove them in court.  About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick guide 17: Open-source intelligence
Asset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Quick guide 17: Open-source intelligence

06/2020
Anti-corruption, transparency and freedom of information initiatives over the last decades have significantly boosted the value of open-source intelligence for both the private and public sectors. In this quick guide, Intelligence Analyst Manuel Medina explains what open-source intelligence is and explores some of the tricky questions it raises.  About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Case Study 1: The Serwamba case: achieving Uganda’s first successful money laundering convictions
Asset Recovery

Case Study 1: The Serwamba case: achieving Uganda’s first successful money laundering convictions

05/2020
This case study explains how Ugandan prosecutors obtained the first ever convictions under the 2013 Anti-Money Laundering Act, overcoming numerous challenges in relation to the financial investigation, prosecution, international cooperation and asset management. This landmark case blazes a trail not just for Uganda but for other countries to prosecute cases of money laundering and recover illicit assets. The analysis sets out the investigation strategy and shows how the prosecutors overcame challenges in relation to conducting the parallel financial investigation, dealing with a vast amount of information and long timescales, securing the cooperation of accomplices as witness, obtaining information from abroad through informal cooperation channels, and managing the confiscated assets (cash, vehicles, land). Open-access licence and acknowledgements This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Walugembe, Tom. 2020. “The Serwamba case: achieving Uganda’s first successful money laundering convictions.” Case Study 1, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/case-studies.  
Quick guide 16: Gold laundering
Anti-Money LaunderingCollective ActionCompliance

Quick guide 16: Gold laundering

03/2020
Mark Pieth, President of the Board of the Basel Institute on Governance and author of the book Gold Laundering, offers an insight into the risks of human rights and environmental harms in gold supply chains. Where are the risks and responsibilities? Collective Action with gold refiners, suppliers and other stakeholders, he concludes, can help to clean up the industry. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 15: Following the money
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 15: Following the money

01/2020
“Follow the money!” Everyone’s talking about it, especially in relation to corruption, fraud and organised crime. What does “following money” actually mean in this context? How do we do it in practice? And what are some of the wider possibilities? Read this quick guide by Stephen Ratcliffe, Senior Investigation Specialist, to find out. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 32: Private-sector engagement in the fight against illegal wildlife trade
Collective ActionGreen Corruption

Working Paper 32: Private-sector engagement in the fight against illegal wildlife trade

12/2019
This working paper explores efforts by and with private-sector organisations to combat the multibillion-dollar illegal wildlife trade (IWT) and/or strengthen their resistance to IWT risks, with a focus on the East Africa – Southeast Asia trading chain. Executive summary There is widespread and growing awareness of the need for greater involvement of the private sector in efforts to prevent IWT. The transport and financial industries are the most clearly affected: the illegal products are usually trafficked via commercial land, sea and air transport services, and financial transactions take place via regulated financial services providers and the global banking system.  For their part, companies are starting to perceive of IWT not just as a conservation issue, and therefore confined to corporate social responsibility departments, but in terms of the risks this illegal trade presents to their business. These risks are tightly intertwined with other risks, particularly corruption and security. Current multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed specifically at tackling industry-specific IWT risks show great promise to create a virtuous circle of engagement and action, but are still in their infant stages. Challenges include getting all relevant stakeholders around the table and building a strong business case for engagement that takes into account companies' specific risks and needs. At the moment, key industry sectors remain unrepresented and will therefore act as a weak link that wildlife traffickers can exploit.  Companies' levels of engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives vary wildly and most are still unclear as to which departments and job functions are the most relevant in this sphere. Action is often ad-hoc and driven by individual "champions", and funding is neither adequate nor sustainable.  Lastly, there is clearly difficulty in moving from commitment to action, in other words for companies to not only sign commitments on paper but operationalise them. Clearer monitoring and evaluation mechanisms would help to increase accountability in this regard. A basic but major identified need is for more reliable, targeted and actionable information and intelligence on IWT, to enable companies to take informed internal measures, co-develop industry guidelines and effect real systems change. This can best be achieved through mechanisms that allow all stakeholders to pool information and resources in pursuit of their common goals. These challenges echo some of the challenges addressed over the years by Collective Action initiatives focused on tackling shared corruption challenges.  This similarity, as well as the strong links between corruption and IWT, means that practitioners can benefit from lessons learned from anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives and do not need to reinvent the wheel. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 31: Applying the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act to gold refineries
Anti-Money LaunderingCompliance

Working Paper 31: Applying the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act to gold refineries

12/2019
Switzerland is the world leader in gold refining. Of the roughly 2,200–3,100 tonnes of raw gold imported into the country each year,  the majority is destined for Swiss gold refineries. Together these companies are estimated to refine 50–70 percent of the world’s gold production, transforming it into gold bars, semi-finished products and other goods.  The imported gold loses all traces of its origin during the refining process. Due to the high-quality manufacturing standards of Swiss refineries, and the fact that they possess all of the pertinent accreditations, the gold can afterwards be traded as "Swiss" gold on international financial markets without restrictions. At the same time, the international gold trade is enormously vulnerable to money laundering operations by drug cartels and other forms of organised crime networks, terrorist organisations, and kleptocrats.  As the world centre of gold refining, Switzerland is highly exposed to these money laundering risks.  This Working Paper first analyses money laundering risks in the gold trade, supported by examples. This is followed by an overview of the gold refineries' due diligence obligations under existing self-regulation and the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). It is shown that the self-regulation models have, at best, mixed success and that the core business of the refineries is not subject to the AMLA. Finally, the paper sets out the pros and cons of applying the AMLA obligations to the core business of Swiss refineries. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is also available in German: Die Unterstellung von Goldraffinerien unter das Geldwäschereigesetz.
Working Paper 31: Die Unterstellung von Goldraffinerien unter das Geldwäschereigesetz
Anti-Money LaunderingCompliance

Working Paper 31: Die Unterstellung von Goldraffinerien unter das Geldwäschereigesetz

12/2019
Die Schweiz ist der global wichtigste Standort für die Raffination von Gold. Jahr für Jahr werden circa 2200-3100 Tonnen Rohgold in die Schweiz importiert. Der Grossteil der Importe ist auf die Geschäftstätigkeit der hiesigen Goldraffinerien zurückzuführen. Sie sollen gemeinsam rund 50-70% der weltweiten Goldproduktion in die Schweiz importieren, um daraus Goldbarren, Halbfabrikate und andere Güter herzustellen.  Durch den in der Schweiz erfolgenden Raffinationsprozess verliert das importierte Gold sämtliche Spuren seiner Herkunft. Aufgrund qualitativ-hochstehender Fertigungsprozesse, sowie der internationalen Akkreditierung der Schweizer Raffinerien, ist es nach dem Raffinierungsprozess als "Schweizer" Gold auf den internationalen Finanzmärkten ohne Restriktionen handelbar.  Gleichzeitig ist der internationale Goldhandel enorm anfällig für Geldwäschereioperationen von Drogenkartellen, kriminellen und terroristischen Organisationen und Potentaten . Als Weltzentrum der Goldraffination ist die Schweiz diesen Geldwäschereirisiken in erhöhtem Masse ausgesetzt.  Im vorliegenden Text werden zunächst die Geldwäschereirisiken im Goldhandel anhand von Beispielen analysiert. Im Anschluss folgt ein Überblick über die Sorgfaltspflichten der Goldraffinerien gemäss der bestehenden Selbstregulierung und dem Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG). Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Selbstregulierungsmodelle bestenfalls gemischt erfolgreich sind und das Kerngeschäft der Raffinerien nicht dem GwG untersteht. Der Text endet mit einer Gegenüberstellung von Pro- und Kontraargumenten hinsichtlich der umfassenden Unterstellung von Goldraffinerien unter das GwG. 
Quick Guide 14: Fundamental skills in tracing assets
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 14: Fundamental skills in tracing assets

11/2019
Recovering criminals’ ill-gotten assets, i.e. confiscating property, cars, yachts, cash and other funds gained through corruption or other acquisitive crimes, is a big topic in law enforcement. Among other benefits, asset recovery acts as a deterrent against crime and makes a clear public statement that illicit wealth will be targeted and returned to the public treasury. In this quick guide, Phill Jones, former Senior Investigation / Asset Recovery Specialist, sets out some fundamental investigative skills that will help investigators trace even the most cleverly hidden assets. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 13: Financial crime in illegal wildlife trade
Asset RecoveryCollective ActionGreen CorruptionPublic Governance

Quick Guide 13: Financial crime in illegal wildlife trade

11/2019
Every day, an unknown number of elephant tusks, rhino horn, pangolin scales and other wildlife products – alive and dead – cross the oceans in container ships and cargo flights for use in traditional medicine, crafts and the illegal pet trade. Rare trees are felled in ancient forests and shipped out under false certificates. They leave behind the butchered carcasses of the last remaining animals of many species, scarred and emptied landscapes, legal livelihoods undermined by corruption and criminal activity, and communities ravaged by organised crime networks. The Basel Institute is contributing to tackling illegal wildlife trade and its negative impacts on communities, economies and biodiversity from the angle of financial crime. This quick guide by our Managing Director Gretta Fenner gives an insight into our approach and how our various areas of expertise fit together to help solve this complex puzzle. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 12: The role of business in tackling illegal wildlife trade
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Quick Guide 12: The role of business in tackling illegal wildlife trade

10/2019
Given the vast dimensions of the multibillion-dollar illegal wildlife trade (IWT), it may be surprising that until recently, global efforts to tackle IWT came mainly from the conservation sector. This has typically consisted of numerous donor-funded efforts to catch poachers and raise public awareness of the plight of endangered species. Valuable as those efforts are, they do little to impact the organised crime networks, corruption and illicit financial flows that allow the lucrative illegal trade in wildlife products to continue. Now, triggered in part by recent high-profile conferences and initiatives targeting IWT, there is greater and growing awareness of the need to involve the private sector in efforts to combat the illegal trade. This quick guide by Scarlet Wannenwetsch, Project Associate Anti-Corruption Collective Action, explores the role that businesses can play in tackling illegal wildlife trade. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 11: Drivers and facilitators of wildlife trafficking
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Quick Guide 11: Drivers and facilitators of wildlife trafficking

09/2019
High-profile law enforcement operations against illegal wildlife trade (IWT), such as Interpol’s Operation Thunderball in July and the arrest of notorious trafficker Moazu Kromah in Uganda in June 2019, have drawn welcome attention to IWT as a financial and organised crime and not only a conservation issue. Yet in working to strengthen legal frameworks and law enforcement capacity in countries that suffer from high levels of IWT, we must not forget the social drivers and facilitators behind wildlife trafficking – factors that laws alone are powerless to change. This quick guide by Saba Kassa, Public Governance Specialist, draws on a recent Basel Institute Working Paper on Corruption and wildlife trafficking, published in the context of a multi-disciplinary programme of work focused on financial crime in IWT. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 10: Social norms and corruption
Public Governance

Quick Guide 10: Social norms and corruption

09/2019
This quick guide by Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of Governance Research, draws on Ms Baez Camargo's decades of research on social norms and their implications for anti-corruption practice. She explores: What is a social norm? How do social norms drive and perpetuate corrupt behaviour? The case of health facilities in East Africa How to identify social norms that drive corrupt behaviour What are the implications for anti-corruption practice? And finally: The million-dollar question: how to design anti-corruption interventions to identify social norms that fuel and perpetuate corruption, measure them and tackle them. The guide draws on a more comprehensive blog published on the website of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) research programme. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 9: International cooperation in asset recovery
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 9: International cooperation in asset recovery

08/2019
What exactly does international cooperation mean in the context of asset recovery? This is a wider question than many people think. It also opens up further questions, such as not only how to return more stolen assets more quickly to victim countries, but how those returned assets can best be used to support sustainable development and strengthen criminal justice systems. Learn more in this quick guide by Shane Nainappan, Senior Asset Recovery Specialist. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 30: Corruption and wildlife trafficking: exploring drivers, facilitators and networks behind illegal wildlife trade in East Africa
Green CorruptionPublic Governance

Working Paper 30: Corruption and wildlife trafficking: exploring drivers, facilitators and networks behind illegal wildlife trade in East Africa

07/2019
As part of a multi-disciplinary programme of work focused on intelligence-led action against financial crime in illegal wildlife trade (IWT), the Public Governance division of the Basel Institute on Governance is leading research and community engagement activities in East Africa. The objective is to contribute towards the prevention and combating of IWT by developing a better understanding of the context-specific drivers of trafficking and the role of informal social networks and their associated corrupt practices in facilitating such illicit behaviours. This Working Paper presents a broad overview of relevant literature on wildlife trafficking, focused on two main questions: Why does wildlife trafficking happen? How does wildlife trafficking happen? It reflects on important themes and dynamics in regard to the wildlife trade in Africa; the drivers and facilitators of wildlife trafficking; the characteristics, functions and operations of trafficking networks; corruption as a cross-cutting theme; and the important role of Uganda as a transit country for the trafficking of wildlife. The literature review provides the conceptual anchor for social network analysis and field research in East Africa, in particular Uganda. The insights gained are important stepping stones to address the third main question of the wider research project: What can be done to curb wildlife trafficking? Developing a better understanding of the root causes of IWT, along with the application of social network analysis to support the investigation of related crimes, provides a novel and complementary approach towards the prevention and effective combating of IWT in East Africa. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Quick Guide 8: eLearning for asset tracing and financial analysis
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 8: eLearning for asset tracing and financial analysis

07/2019
Someone once said that the more knowledge is freely shared, the more it grows. Our free eLearning courses on asset tracing, intelligence gathering and financial analysis exemplify this idea. Peter Huppertz, Team Leader IT and eLearning, explains some of the benefits of online courses for financial investigators, analysts and others who need to acquire and practise these complex skills. View the quick guide online here. Download the PDF here. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 7: The role of FIUs in asset recovery
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 7: The role of FIUs in asset recovery

07/2019
Practically every country has a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and it plays a vital role in combating money laundering and other financial crimes. Yet there is often confusion – even among anti-corruption authorities – about how it works, what it can and can’t do, and what value it brings.  Thierry Ravalomanda, Senior Asset Recovery Specialist offers a quick overview. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 6: Effective training on financial investigations
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 6: Effective training on financial investigations

06/2019
Sophisticated and complex financial crimes span the globe. “Following the trail of the money” can involve many jurisdictions, each with their own laws and practices, and varying capacity or willingness to cooperate internationally. Fighting corruption and money laundering, and recovering criminal proceeds, are therefore complex challenges. Specialised legal, financial accounting, analytical and investigation skills are essential. Phyllis Atkinson, Head of Training at the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR), explains ICAR’s unique training approach – and how it helps investigators, prosecutors, members of the judiciary and Financial Intelligence Units in partner countries gain these investigative skills quickly and effectively. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 5: Illicit enrichment
Asset Recovery

Quick Guide 5: Illicit enrichment

06/2019
This quick guide offers a short introduction to illicit enrichment laws, which are emerging as a powerful tool to combat corruption and recover stolen assets. Originally published in May 2019, it was updated in June 2021 following the Basel Institute’s publication of an open-access book on Illicit Enrichment: a Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth. In this quick guide the book's author Andrew Dornbierer, Asset Recovery Specialist, explains what "illicit enrichment" or “unexplained wealth” mean – and how they can open the door to recovering stolen assets. He covers: What is illicit enrichment in a nutshell? Why are illicit enrichment laws useful in anti-corruption efforts? Is it a crime? Why is there some controversy? How is illicit enrichment investigated and prosecuted? Are there any recent case studies? About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 29: Recovering assets in support of the SDGs – from soft to hard assets for development
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 29: Recovering assets in support of the SDGs – from soft to hard assets for development

05/2019
This Working Paper aims to contribute to the international policy dialogue on the link between asset recovery and countries’ pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals. It contends that supporting countries in recovering stolen assets and promoting sustainable development are mutually reinforcing. It also aims to correct the false reputation of asset recovery as a very technical legalistic field of development cooperation, and to generate broader understanding of the far-reaching role that asset recovery can play to foster development. The paper argues that helping countries recover stolen assets, anchored in target 16.4 of the SDGs, can mobilise important resources to finance development or poverty reduction efforts.  In addition, it explores how asset recovery plays a critical role in strengthening some of the key foundations of sustainable development, such as the rule of law and strong, transparent and accountable institutions.  Combining “hard assets” in terms of actual assets recovered and the “soft assets” that are needed to do so effectively, ranging from the capacity of law enforcement institutions to the political will to fight criminal networks, provides a powerful foundation for sustainable development. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It was drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) Secretariat and has received inputs from representatives of the UK’s Department for International Development, the Swiss Development Cooperation, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, and the governments of Liechtenstein and the Bailiwick of Jersey. It was discussed with the above representatives at the meeting of ICAR core donors on 28 November 2018 in St Helier, Jersey. It also benefitted from discussions at the International Expert Meeting on the Return of Stolen Assets, “Addis II”, in May 2019.
Quick Guide 4: Social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking
Asset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Quick Guide 4: Social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking

05/2019
Jacopo Costa, Senior Research Fellow, offers this quick guide to social network analysis (SNA). He explains how it can help us to better understand and tackle the transnational organised crime and dark networks that sustain corruption, money laundering and illicit trafficking.  What is social network analysis?  What can it tell us? What goes into the analysis? How can SNA help law enforcement authorities and policymakers? About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 2: Intelligence
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset RecoveryGreen Corruption

Quick Guide 2: Intelligence

05/2019
Manuel Medina, specialised Intelligence Analyst for our Illegal Wildlife Trade programme, sets out the basics of intelligence analysis and why we do it. Key questions are: What is intelligence in a nutshell? What types of intelligence are there? How does intelligence reduce information overload? How do you know whether intelligence is reliable? How is intelligence produced? About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 3: Integrity and anti-corruption compliance for SMEs
Collective ActionCompliance

Quick Guide 3: Integrity and anti-corruption compliance for SMEs

05/2019
Gemma Aiolfi, Head of Compliance and Collective Action, explains that anti-corruption compliance doesn’t have to be complicated. Even small and mid-sized companies can easily build the basics of an effective anti-corruption compliance programme. Find out five simple things a business leader can do to raise integrity in an organisation. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 28: Regulating cryptocurrencies: challenges and considerations
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 28: Regulating cryptocurrencies: challenges and considerations

04/2019
Cryptocurrency regulations are developing fast. Across the world, authorities are reacting to the emerging threat posed by criminals using new payment methods to conceal and launder the proceeds of their crimes. However, as the application of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) due diligence requirements becomes stricter and more entities implement preventative measures, criminals are constantly looking elsewhere for potential havens for their illicit activities. This Working Paper offers an insight into some potential consequences of changes in AML/CFT legislation in relation to cryptocurrency exchange services and virtual assets. This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Quick Guide 1: Cryptocurrencies and money laundering investigations
Anti-Money LaunderingCompliance

Quick Guide 1: Cryptocurrencies and money laundering investigations

03/2019
This quick guide to cryptocurrencies and money laundering investigations addresses the use of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Monero to facilitate serious crimes or to launder stolen money. It was originally published in March 2019 and updated in August 2021. It explores, in brief: What kind of crimes involve cryptocurrencies? How do you "follow" virtual money? What are the challenges in recovering stolen assets held in cryptocurrencies? What more can law enforcement do to enhance their ability to investigate and prosecute cryptocurrency-related crimes? The author, Senior Investigation Specialist Federico Paesano, leads the Basel Institute's Cryptocurrencies and AML Compliance Training. The four-session course is delivered virtually and is open to anyone seeking to prevent, detect and investigate the use of virtual assets for illicit activities, including both law enforcement and private-sector professionals. The guide draws on recommendations of the Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies, co-hosted annually by the Basel Institute on Governance, Europol and INTERPOL. About this Quick Guide This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 27: Anti-corruption Collective Action: Success factors, sustainability and strategies
Collective Action

Working Paper 27: Anti-corruption Collective Action: Success factors, sustainability and strategies

11/2018
Anti-corruption Collective Action Initiatives (CAIs) are structured efforts that bring together private sector actors with other stakeholders with the aim of preventing corruption and improving the business environment in a particular context. The landscape of CAIs is extremely diverse. Differences cut across the type and number of stakeholders involved. Initiatives can be sector-specific or cross-sectoral. They can be applied at the community, country, regional or global level. This paper is based on two recent workshops in which a wide variety of international Collective Action practitioners shared their experiences, success factors and strategies for overcoming common challenges. For more information about Collective Action, see the B20 Collective Action Hub. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 26: The ambivalence of social networks and their role in spurring and potential for curbing petty corruption: comparative insights from East Africa
Public Governance

Working Paper 26: The ambivalence of social networks and their role in spurring and potential for curbing petty corruption: comparative insights from East Africa

10/2018
This paper compares social network dynamics and related petty corrupt practices in East Africa. It highlights how the properties of structural and functional networks could serve as entry points for anti-corruption interventions. With a focus on the health sector in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, the empirical findings from this research corroborate the role of social networks in perpetuating collective practices of petty corruption, including bribery, favouritism and gift-giving. The paper makes a case for designing a novel type of behavioural anti-corruption intervention, whereby the power of social networks is harnessed to elicit behavioural and attitudinal change for anti-corruption outcomes. This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 25: High Level Reporting Mechanisms: A comparative analysis
Collective ActionHLRM

Working Paper 25: High Level Reporting Mechanisms: A comparative analysis

09/2018
This report discusses the different contexts and processes through which a High Level Reporting Mechanism (HLRM) has been designed and implemented in Colombia, Ukraine, Panama and Argentina, as well as initial interest in the HLRM model in Peru. Its aim is to understand the specificities of each case and draw lessons applicable to future projects in other countries, whilst respecting the commitment to develop an HLRM that takes account of the specific country’s context.  About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Policy Brief 4: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Tanzania
Public Governance

Policy Brief 4: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Tanzania

12/2017
This policy brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from research on corruption, social norms and behaviours in Tanzania. While the findings show that petty corruption is prevalent and results in inequitable public service delivery, they also inform that citizen and public officials’ attitudes and behaviours towards corruption are shifting as a result of changes in the political environment. The evidence furthermore suggests that the effectiveness of conventional anti-corruption approaches may be enhanced by incorporating behavioural insights about entrenched social norms and collective understandings that are associated with practices of bribery and favouritism. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia, and Saba Kassa. 2017. "Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Tanzania." Policy Brief 4, Basel Institute on Governance.
Policy Brief 3: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Rwanda
Public Governance

Policy Brief 3: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Rwanda

11/2017
This Policy Brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from a research on corruption, social norms and behaviours in Rwanda. The findings show that, although Rwanda has successfully curbed corruption, favouritism continues to be used to secure preferential access to public health services. While the Rwandan experience illustrates how behavioural insights can effectively complement conventional anti-corruption approaches, further entry areas for deepening behavioural anti-corruption interventions are also identified. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia, Cosimo Stahl, and Saba Kassa. 2017. "Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Tanzania." Policy Brief 4, Basel Institute on Governance.
Policy Brief 2: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Uganda
Public Governance

Policy Brief 2: Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Uganda

10/2017
This policy brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from research on corruption, social norms and behaviours in Uganda. The empirical evidence indicates that behavioural factors associated to social practices and collective understandings play a role in shaping Ugandan citizens’ attitudes towards petty corruption and in fuelling practices such as bribery and favouritism. On the basis of the research findings, policy recommendations are put forward aiming to contribute to the development of anti-corruption interventions that incorporate behavioural insights in their design and implementation.    About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia, Cosimo Stahl, and Saba Kassa. 2017. "Social norms, mental models and other behavioural drivers of petty corruption – the case of Uganda." Policy Brief 2, Basel Institute on Governance.
Working Paper 24: It takes two to tango. Decision-making processes on asset return
Asset RecoveryPublic Governance

Working Paper 24: It takes two to tango. Decision-making processes on asset return

10/2017
This Working Paper presents findings from a research project that sought to better understand decision-making processes on the return of illegally obtained assets using the examples of past cases of returning assets that had been stolen from Kazakhstan, Peru and the Philippines. While previous papers on the subject of returning stolen assets and end-use of returned assets were based on third-party and desk research, the research feeding into this working paper is based on first-hand accounts collected through semi-structured interviews with key decision makers involved in these cases in the concerned states. The key objective of the research was to better understand the motivations, considerations and processes that led to the decisions on how and for what purpose to use returned assets. In this context, the report in particular looks at a question often debated in asset recovery circles, namely whether there may be a power imbalance between requesting and requested states in these processes despite the fact that requesting states are legally empowered through the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The potential existence of such a power imbalance has in the past often given rise to concern, as it is perceived to potentially compromise the fundamental principles of asset return of UNCAC and the sovereignty of the concerned states. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 23: New perspectives in e-government and the prevention of corruption
Collective ActionCompliancePublic Governance

Working Paper 23: New perspectives in e-government and the prevention of corruption

07/2017
Does e-government have an impact in reducing corruption? Do e-government solutions sufficiently take private sector perspectives into account to maximise its potential for addressing corruption risks?  This paper addresses these and additional questions about the dynamic between governments and the private sector with respect to harnessing e-governance tools for corruption prevention. It is written primarily from a private sector perspective and for private sector actors who are interested in a more comprehensive understanding of the scope and examples of e-government solutions to improve their anti-corruption policies, but concludes with numerous recommendations for the private sector and governments alike. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. The Basel Institute on Government was granted funding by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). The work was undertaken between September 2016 and May 2017.
Working Paper 22: Hidden agendas, social norms and why we need to re-think anti-corruption
Public Governance

Working Paper 22: Hidden agendas, social norms and why we need to re-think anti-corruption

06/2017
In many countries high levels of corruption persist in spite of the adoption of so-called anti-corruption “best practices”. In this paper we make a call to pursue a context-sensitive inquiry into the drivers of corruption in order to substantially improve the practices and effects of anti-corruption. We discuss evidence from case studies in Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus suggesting that high levels of corruption are associated to a significant discrepancy between formal rules and informal practices. Informal practices of co-optation, control and camouflage are used by political and business elites to safeguard regime survival via a de facto re-distribution of public resources in favour of informal networks of “insiders”. From the perspective of citizens, corrupt acts such as bribing enjoy social acceptability especially when they are effective in solving practical problems and protecting livelihoods. The functional relevance of informal practices clarifies the factors behind the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption law-driven reforms, short-term action plans, and technical measures that focus on particular processes, procedures and institutions. We argue for the need to ponder informality and consider how it may help us develop better anti-corruption strategies. The prevalence and entrenched nature of informal practices indicate their heuristic potential: they can tell us what we are missing in official policies, inform about resistances and can help uncover pathways to strategic, sustainable reforms. This paper has been presented at the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum 2017 in a form of a poster presentation. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Policy Brief 1: Can a behavioural approach help fight corruption?
Public Governance

Policy Brief 1: Can a behavioural approach help fight corruption?

01/2017
This Policy Brief summarises the lessons learned from a systematic literature review that explored the feasibility of adopting a behavioural approach to address petty corruption. The findings point to the importance of developing messages that challenge conventional wisdom about the inevitability of corruption, emphasising the costs of corruption to the welfare of individuals as well as showcasing examples of successful detection and punishment of crimes of corruption. Accounting for prevailing social norms and beliefs is also key because otherwise anti-corruption interventions may disseminate concepts and promote actions that fail to deliver the desired messages to their intended beneficiaries. About this Policy Brief This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia. 2017. "Can a behavioural approach help fight corruption?." Policy Brief 1, Basel Institute on Governance.
Working Paper 21: Globale Finanzflüsse und nachhaltige Entwicklung: Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Schweiz aus Sicht der Entwicklungspolitik
Anti-Money LaunderingPublic Governance

Working Paper 21: Globale Finanzflüsse und nachhaltige Entwicklung: Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Schweiz aus Sicht der Entwicklungspolitik

01/2016
Im Rahmen von UNO und OECD diskutiert die internationale Gemeinschaft zurzeit intensiv, warum die meisten Entwicklungsländer nicht über ausreichend Ressourcen zur Finanzierung der für sie notwendigen Investitionen und ihrer öffentlichen Dienstleistungen verfügen. Dabei fällt das Augenmerk jeweils schnell auf die Ausgestaltung des internationalen Finanz- und Steuersystems. Mit welcher Art Investitionen kann man eine nachhaltige Entwicklung fördern? Wie kann der chronische Abfluss von finanziellen Ressourcen (namentlich aus Rohstoff-reichen Ländern) – oftmals als unlautere und illegale Finanzflüsse (illicit financial flows) umschrieben – reduziert werden? Welche Rolle spielt schliesslich die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe in diesem Gesamtbild? Die Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (DEZA) hat am 29. Oktober 2015 mit Unterstützung des Basel Institute on Governance und unter der Leitung von Prof. Mark Pieth eine Fachtagung‚ Globale Finanzflüsse für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung – Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Schweiz aus Sicht der Entwicklungspolitik‘ durchgeführt. Das vorliegende Dokument stellt die Vorarbeiten und Resultate der Tagung zusammen. Mit einem Vorwort von Pio Wennubst, Vizedirektor Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (DEZA). About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 20: Corruption and human rights
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset RecoveryPublic Governance

Working Paper 20: Corruption and human rights

03/2015
It is a fact that states with a high corruption rate (or a high corruption perception) are at the same time those with a bad human rights situation. Beyond this coincidence, the paper seeks to identify a concrete legal relationship between corruption and deficient human rights protection. This seems relevant and practical terms, because the extant international norms against corruption have so far yielded only modest success; their implementation could be improved with the help of human rights arguments and instruments. This paper therefore discusses a dual question: Can corrupt behaviour be conceptualised as a human rights violation? Should corrupt behaviour be categorised and sanctioned as a human rights violation? The author's answer is that such a juridic reconstruction is plausible under specific conditions, especially for petty corruption, but that we should be aware of the risks of such reframing of the issue. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 19: High Level Reporting Mechanisms in Colombia and Ukraine
Anti-Money LaunderingCollective ActionHLRMPublic Finance ManagementPublic Governance

Working Paper 19: High Level Reporting Mechanisms in Colombia and Ukraine

02/2015
The responsibility for governments to address bribe solicitation derives from internationally recognised anticorruption standards all of which prohibit the ‘demand side’ of bribery, namely, the solicitation by a public official of an undue advantage. So far however, most governmental anti-bribery efforts have focused on the offering or giving of bribes by companies and their employees. They have neglected practical solutions to support companies that are faced with explicit or implicit demands for bribes when dealing with public administrations, for example in the context of public contracts, business licensing or tax audits. Unless they pay these bribes, companies may risk losing business or face obstructions to doing business. The concept of high level reporting mechanisms (HLRM) has been devised to help address this gap experienced by companies that are solicited for bribes or subject to other forms of extortion and unfair treatment. Two countries have pioneered the concept so far, namely Colombia and Ukraine. This paper describes the underlying purpose and principles of the HLRM, reviews how this was translated into national mechanisms in these countries, and offers some initial comments on the lessons learned. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 18: Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit
Public Governance

Working Paper 18: Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit

01/2015
This practitioners’ handbook provides the required tools for contextualising social accountability initiatives aimed at empowering citizens to engage in anti-corruption actions. The material herein contained has been developed through a collaborative effort with UNDP and reflects the findings from academic research conducted in the scope of the ANTICORRP research consortium (anticorrp.eu). The handbook presents an analytical framework through which the critical dimensions involved in developing successful anti-corruption social accountability initiatives are identified. It also includes concrete research tools that may be applied in order to obtain key information about the communities intended to engage in anti-corruption actions and guidelines to aid implementers in designing participatory schemes that best meet the characteristics of the local context. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 17: The role of donors in the recovery of stolen assets
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 17: The role of donors in the recovery of stolen assets

12/2014
Financial crimes such as corruption, fraud, and embezzlement generate significant profits, often at the expense of the public budget. These proceeds of crime are usually hidden outside of the country where the crime was originally committed, and laundered through complex financial and commercial transactions, often spanning across numerous jurisdictions. Asset recovery – the process of identifying, restraining, seizing, and repatriating these assets to the countries from whence they were originally stolen – is one of the greatest challenges for the global anti-corruption movement. Asset recovery is also an essential development challenge, as it usually involves repatriating funds back to a developing country where they were stolen, and where they could be used to support development projects. As a bridge between aid recipient and donor countries, donor agencies are uniquely positioned to support asset recovery initiatives. Interesting examples are emerging of how donors can support asset recovery by: supporting international standards and initiatives; providing technical assistance and capacity building (most often through third parties); encouraging policy coherence at home; helping build political will; and providing assistance during the asset repatriation phase. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 16: Social accountability and its conceptual challenges
Public Governance

Working Paper 16: Social accountability and its conceptual challenges

02/2013
Social accountability has become a favoured approach among most major multilateral and bilateral donors to develop grass roots mechanisms for democratic governance. In a successful scenario, citizen participation can promote more responsive governments and better provision of basic services by linking users’ feedback to the policy design, implementation and monitoring activities typically undertaken by the state. However, there is a lack of agreement about which specific types of social accountability interventions yield the best results and what are the causal pathways that are critical to generate positive changes. This paper presents an analytical framework that identifies the key components that are required to exercise effective direct accountability and provides a blueprint to assess social accountability initiatives. About this Working Paper This paper appeared in eucrim, the European Criminal Law Associations’ Forum, 2013/2, published by Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, c/o Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i. B., Germany. This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 15: Tracking and tracing stolen assets in foreign jurisdictions
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 15: Tracking and tracing stolen assets in foreign jurisdictions

01/2013
It has been estimated that roughly 1.6 trillion USD in criminal proceeds are laundered through the international financial system each year. To put this in perspective, this sum is more than the combined GDPs of Switzerland, Portugal, Romania, Belarus, and Austria in 2011. To enjoy this unnerving amount of illicit assets, criminals are forced to launder these funds through legitimate international financial channels in an attempt to disguise their illegitimate origins. Consequently, if an investigator knows how and where to look, there is always a connection that links a criminal’s assets to his or her crimes – and if sufficient evidence of this connection can be shown, then law enforcers can use it to successfully take legal action and return the assets to the victims of their crime. About this Working Paper This paper appeared in eucrim, the European Criminal Law Associations’ Forum, 2013/2, published by Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, c/o Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i. B., Germany. This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 14: Using money laundering investigations to fight corruption in developing countries
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 14: Using money laundering investigations to fight corruption in developing countries

12/2012
Anti-money laundering systems have the potential to curb the use of proceeds of corruption and other crimes by the perpetrators. An effectively implemented anti-money laundering framework limits the channels through which illicit funds can be laundered, making crime riskier and reducing the incentives for corrupt activities. However, those who stand to benefit from corruption have strong incentives to block anti-money laundering programmes. In addition, these programmes face significant obstacles to effectiveness in most developing countries. Relevant institutions do not trust each other sufficiently to share information necessary for investigations. Counties lack qualified staff and necessary resources, and slow bureaucratic procedures are unable to keep up with the speed of financial transactions. This paper explores these and other domestic obstacles and suggests strategies to overcome them, based on an analysis of the situations in Albania and Tanzania. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 13: Collective Action and corruption
Collective Action

Working Paper 13: Collective Action and corruption

09/2012
The working paper outlines the historical background and early experiments in the field of Collective Action. It also examines methods and challenges and depicts recent examples of Collective Action initiatives. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 12: Basel Art Trade Guidelines: An intermediary report of a self-regulation initiative
Anti-Money LaunderingCollective Action

Working Paper 12: Basel Art Trade Guidelines: An intermediary report of a self-regulation initiative

01/2012
The art trade market is global, highly fragmented and complex, involving a great variety of operators. In light of this complexity, the current level of regulation and existing compliance efforts by individual operators has proven to be insufficient. With some competitors engaged in unethical or illegal behaviour, operating profitably while acting with integrity and ethics is increasingly difficult. As other industry sectors (e.g. the financial sector when faced with the challenge of effectively combating money laundering) have experienced, Collective Action by key market participants can be a highly effective way to systematically and comprehensively address such business practices and to ensure fair and efficient competition in a global market. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 11: A framework to assess governance of health systems in low income countries
Public Governance

Working Paper 11: A framework to assess governance of health systems in low income countries

08/2011
As awareness of the role governance in the performance of health systems has increased, so has the need to come up with systematic means to evaluate governance shortcomings to develop adequate interventions. This working paper describes a framework to assess governance in the health systems of low-income countries that is intended to have empirical applicability with a problem-driven approach. The analysis is grounded on a re-categorization of governance dimensions for greater heuristic power, with an emphasis made on the importance of strategic systems design and accountability. The proposed methodology includes mapping of both formal and informal institutions, actors and networks. This underscores the idea that in order to properly address governance weaknesses it is of utmost importance to have an insight into whether the interplay of formal and informal norms facilitates or undermines system performance. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 10: Accountability for better healthcare provision
Public Governance

Working Paper 10: Accountability for better healthcare provision

07/2011
Strengthening accountability in public service provision is increasingly recognized as a precondition to improve the performance of the health sector in low-income countries. However, progress in this field has been hampered to a great extent because of empirical difficulties in measuring and assessing accountability. This article provides a clear operational definition of the concept and discusses how and why accountability in public health service provision presents distinct challenges to the institutional capabilities of most developing countries. On the basis of both elements a set of guidelines to empirically assess accountability in health services is offered. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 9: The situation of Financial Intelligence Units in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Anti-Money LaunderingAsset Recovery

Working Paper 9: The situation of Financial Intelligence Units in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

01/2011
The transition process in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe from a one-party state to a democratic system has been long and difficult and has frequently been accompanied by institutional instability. The judiciary and law enforcement bodies have been no exception. Both have suffered from a weak legal tradition in many countries of the region, weak implementation of existing legislation, limited operational effectiveness, corruption and the influence of informal personal networks. These developments can also be observed in the area of financial intelligence. Following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the events of September 2001, most countries of the region adopted legislation aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing, as required by their international commitments as well as EU entry requirements. In this context, most countries also set up the required institutions, notably a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 8: The recovery of stolen assets: seeking to balance fundamental human rights at stake
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 8: The recovery of stolen assets: seeking to balance fundamental human rights at stake

01/2010
The recovery of stolen assets is a fundamental principle of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). By including this element in the said Convention, the international community recognizes the negative impacts on countries and populations deprived of the billions of dollars that are diverted each year by their corrupt leaders and public officials. The confiscation and restitution of these illicitly acquired funds may benefit affected, generally poor, countries in urgent need of resources to finance, for example, social programs or infrastructural projects. As these assets are essential for the well-being of the population, their repatriation can thus contribute to repairing the damage caused by the embezzlement. This paper intends to analyze the way in which fundamental human rights are susceptible to being violated by the illegal acquisition of personal wealth; these are essentially economic, social and cultural rights. Furthermore, the paper tries to identify who the victims are. It shows not only the necessity of punishing the perpetrators of corrupt practices but also underlines the need to guarantee that their fundamental rights, such as the presumption of innocence and the guarantee of property rights, are respected in the process of asset recovery. Approaching the issue of asset recovery with a human rights perspective it becomes clear that asset recovery is a process whereby it is essential to respect not only the victims’ interests but also to preserve the rights of all persons concerned.  About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 7: The political economy of asset recovery processes
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 7: The political economy of asset recovery processes

02/2009
Since the mid-1990s, the fight against corruption has become an integral part of the international development agenda. Along with the growing concern about corruption, the problem of assets stolen by public officials came to the fore of the agenda. This is evidenced by a steady increase in international agreements, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions adopted in 1997, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) signed in 2003. The UNCAC, in particular, includes specific mechanisms that facilitate repatriation of stolen public assets. Since political will is the concentrated expression of powerful political and economic interests in a country, more attention must be paid to these interests when it comes to asset recovery measures. This is the aim of the working paper. By using the political economy framework, the paper identifies the political and institutional obstacles to effective policy implementation. The focus will be on the factors involved in the process of international recovery of stolen assets, although this process can and should not be analysed separately from the broader challenge of the fight against corruption. Both these issues are interrelated and can have a significant impact on each other. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 6: Managing proceeds of asset recovery: The case of Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines and Kazakhstan
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 6: Managing proceeds of asset recovery: The case of Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines and Kazakhstan

01/2009
This paper looks at the use of proceeds of asset recovered from Sani Abacha, Vladimir Montesinos, and Ferdinand Marcos and their families. It will also briefly address a much more recent case involving Kazakhstan. Repatriation of stolen monies makes available additional resources for development activities. The challenge is to ensure efficient, accountable and transparent use of such assets, given states may lack capacity or political will and that corruption may be prevalent at various levels of government. Transparency allows for better utilisation of recovered assets, and better targeting of resources into sectors that have potential to benefit the victims of corruption, who happen to be mostly the poor. Lack of effective follow up mechanisms may lead to the inappropriate allocation of resources into sectors that have little effect on alleviating poverty. The cases under review here offer lessons on how to manage repatriation and utilisation of proceeds of asset recovery. Further lessons relate to the participation of third parties and the benefits of making the results of the entire process public. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 5: Poverty and corruption: About poorer and richer ways of life
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 5: Poverty and corruption: About poorer and richer ways of life

12/2008
The Millennium Development Goals were adopted by the global community under the aegis of the UN in 2000. The first of these goals aims at halving absolute poverty of the about 1.1 billion people who live on less than 1 US dollar a day. Although poverty reduction has always been an important concern of development policy, the Millennium Development Goals have brought it back onto centre stage with renewed vigour, in that joint efforts to reduce poverty worldwide has become a moral as well as financial obligation of the global community. Just a glance at the global development indicators reveals how urgent the renewed efforts to fight extreme poverty, especially – and not surprisingly – in least developed countries. According to the UN statistics the number of persons living in extreme poverty has decreased slightly between 1990 and 2001; but it is still estimated that worldwide still approximately one billion people live on less than 1 US dollar a day. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 3: Verhaltensregeln für die Verwaltung von Vorsorgeeinrichtungen
Asset Recovery

Working Paper 3: Verhaltensregeln für die Verwaltung von Vorsorgeeinrichtungen

01/2007
Eine ganze Reihe von Problemfällen hat zu einer breiten Diskussion über das Verhalten der Verantwortlichen für Vorsorgeeinrichtungen geführt, insbesondere bei der internen und externen Verwaltung der Vorsorgevermögens, und aufgezeigt, dass beachtliche Defizite bestehen, vor allem wenn Vergleiche mit anderen professionellen Vermögensverwaltern, wie Banken, gezogen werden. Im Vordergrund muss der Schutz des guten Rufs der einzelnen Vorsorgeeinrichtung sowie das Vertrauen der Begünstigten in die Integrität der mit der Verwaltung dieses Sozialkapitals Betrauten stehen. Grundsätzlich sollten deshalb an Vorsorgeeinrichtungen, was den guten Ruf ihrer obersten Organe und die Gewährleistung der Ordnungsmässigkeit angeht, vergleichbare Anforderungen gestellt werden. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 2: Multistakeholder initiatives to combat money laundering and bribery
Anti-Money LaunderingCollective Action

Working Paper 2: Multistakeholder initiatives to combat money laundering and bribery

01/2006
Intensified economic globalisation has had positive and negative effects. It has left nation states struggling to deal with the negative fall-out. National regulation against abuses has, however, proven increasingly ineffective, especially since companies have the freedom to move their hazardous activities to under-regulated areas. States have stepped up cooperation and coordination on a bilateral as well as a multilateral basis: international organisations and treaties become more and more relevant to the regulation of international trade relations. However, the traditional instruments of international law are frequently considered too cumbersome and slow. Increasingly international law is created by unconventional means: ‘task forces’ prove to be far more expedient, since they prefer ‘soft law’ to treaty law. Political enforcement by peer-pressure becomes more relevant than by juridical instruments (e.g. courts and tribunals). Furthermore, regulation goes well beyond law-making by legislators and government bodies; non-state actors contribute extensively, especially in the area of regulating international trade relations. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.
Working Paper 1: Anti-money laundering: Levelling the playing field
Anti-Money LaunderingCompliancePublic Finance Management

Working Paper 1: Anti-money laundering: Levelling the playing field

01/2003
Switzerland is frequently accused of being reluctant to take thorough measures to fight money laundering. Both the Swiss authorities and the banks in Switzerland strongly reject such accusations. We are convinced that our anti-money laundering measures are best market practice. What are the reasons for these markedly different viewpoints? Can they be explained by conceptual differences? Are the negative statements the result of insufficient knowledge of our legal provisions, or are they simply motivated by the political desire of the respective commentators to divert public attention from the deficient anti-money laundering policies in their own countries? A comparison of our measures with the most important competing financial centres could help to answer these questions. The SFS Stiftung Finanzplatz Schweiz – a foundation initiated by the foreign banks in Switzerland – commissioned Professor Mark Pieth of the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct a comparative study of anti-money laundering regulations in the UK, the US and Singapore, the three financial centres which closely compete with the Swiss private banking sector. Professor Pieth is a renowned expert in the field and has close contacts with the international experts who also contributed to the project with in-depth country studies. About this Working Paper This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.